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Summary 
 
During late 2015, State Capture became the topic of conversation in South Africa 
as news broke of the Gupta family, principally represented by Ajay, Atul and Rajesh 
Gupta, having a close relationship with the former president, Jacob Zuma, and 
controlling the appointments of ministers and chief executive officers of state-owned 
companies. South Africa would later become a prime example of how a 
constitutional and democratic state is still capable of being captured to further the 
economic and financial goals of a select group of individuals. 
As news broke of State Capture and the various actions taken by the Guptas, the 
four major banks within South Africa conducted rigorous investigations and all 
concluded to close the bank accounts of the Gupta family and its associated 
companies. Following the closure, many cabinet ministers, the African National 
Congress and an Inter-ministerial Committee sought to intervene in the decision by 
the banks to close the accounts to attempt to persuade or influence the banks to 
change their decision. The actions of these involved are questionable giving rise to 
the question on whether the sacrosanctity of the banking industry had been 
compromised and thus captured.  
Fortunately, the banking industry successfully defended itself against being 
captured however, it revealed that the banking industry is not immune to capture. 
The sacrosanctity of the banking industry would have been compromised had 
leadership of such banks not fully understood the law in which such banks operate 
and are obliged to adhere to but the also the consequence of non-compliance. Had 
the banking industry been captured, it would have plunged the economy into 
recession, increased unemployment and poverty and locked South Africa out of 
international trade.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General introduction  
When considering the topic of State Capture in South Africa, one of the most famous 
quotes in English literature by Lord Acton comes to mind: "Power tends to corrupt, 
and absolute power corrupts absolutely". South Africa has become a prime example 
of what this quote means and how it begins to manifest even in a constitutional and 
democratic country. 
Like many other countries throughout the world, South Africa has been plagued by 
corruption. However, in the last quarter of 2015, a media frenzy ensued alluding to 
something far greater than corruption - a prominent family,1 with a close relationship 
to the former president, Jacob Zuma (Zuma), his family and factions with the ruling 
party, were able to inter alia influence appointments of cabinet ministers, board 
members of state-owned enterprises (SOE's) and tender awards giving rise to 
questions on whether our constitutional and democratic state had been captured. 
Soon, State Capture became the topic on everyone's lips, so much so that in 2017, 
"State Capture" was named the word of the year in South Africa.2 Two years later, 
this remains the word of the year.  
But what is State Capture exactly? In its simplest form, State Capture is the most 
pervasive form of corruption where: 
"…powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country 
use corruption to shape a nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit 
their own private interests".3 
                                                   
1 The prominent family referred to throughout this dissertation is the Gupta family principally 
represented by Ajay, Atul and Rajesh Gupta. The family will be referred to herein as "the Guptas". 
The Guptas operated a number of entities within South Africa namely Oakbay Investments (Pty) Ltd 
(Oakbay), Siva Uranium (Pty) Ltd, Tegeta Exploration and Resources (Pty) Ltd and others. These 
entities held various banking accounts and credit facilities with the major banks in South Africa. The 
banking accounts will be referred to interchangeably as "the Gupta accounts" or "the bank accounts". 
2 Alexis Haden "South African Word of the Year 2018: Here’s the shortlisted top three" 14-10-2018 
https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/south-africa-word-of-the-year-2018-shortlist/ (7-09-2019). 
3 Transparency International Plain Language Guide (2009). 
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Arguably, the beginning of the end for the Guptas occurred in 2016 when four major 
banks in South Africa, namely, First National Bank Limited (FNB), Standard Bank of 
South Africa Limited (Standard Bank), Absa Bank Limited (ABSA) and Nedbank 
Limited (Nedbank),4 elected to terminate the bank-customer relationship with the 
Guptas and their associated entities and close their relevant bank accounts. This 
led to a series of events worth considering in this dissertation. 
Accordingly, this dissertation will seek to address the question whether, in 
considering the events that took place both prior to and after the closure of the Gupta 
accounts, the sacrosanctity of the South African banking industry and the laws under 
which it operates had been undermined or in some way affected by State Capture. 
This dissertation will also consider the legal issues relating to the banking industry 
that arose during the Commission of Inquiry into State Capture (Inquiry) chaired by 
the Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Raymond Zondo (Zondo), 
which may be of some importance to the banking industry in future.  
1.2 Introduction to the Gupta saga 
After the media frenzy on State Capture began unfolding during latter part of 2015, 
and following a public statement made by the former deputy minister of finance, 
Mcebisi Jonas (Jonas) confirming that the Gupta family had offered him the position 
of minister of finance and together with various other complaints, the former public 
protector, advocate Thuli Madonsela (Madonsela), constitutionally mandated to 
support and defend democracy, sprang into action and began investigating the 
allegations of State Capture. On 2 November 2016, and after Zuma abandoned his 
application to interdict the release of the report into the allegations of State Capture 
compiled by Madonsela, the report entitled "State of Capture" was released (the 
Report). The Report, that is some 355 pages long, not only lists disturbing 
interactions by cabinet ministers, senior officials at the helms of SOE's with the 
Gupta family but also states that, from evidence gathered, that the Guptas made six 
billion rand from the state and wanted to increase it to eight billion rand with the help 
of cabinet ministers and treasury. 
 
                                                   
4 These banks will be collectively referred to herein as "the banks". 
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On 9 January 2018, more than a year after the Report was released and upon the 
recommendations of Madonsela contained in the Report, Zuma announced the 
establishment of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into allegations of State Capture 
and the appointment Zondo as its chairperson. The Inquiry commenced on August 
2018. 
One of the complaints that spurred Madonsela into action to begin investigating the 
allegations of State Capture, was a complaint by an anonymous member of the 
public who essentially wanted to know if it was appropriate for cabinet to assist 
private businesses in its banking relationship with its bankers and whether 
corruption was not involved as matters such as these should perhaps have  been 
dealt with by the national consumer commission or the banking ombudsman but not 
cabinet. The complaint was essentially about cabinet's involvement or alleged 
interference with the closure of the Gupta accounts by the banks. 
During 17 to 19 September 2018, the banks gave evidence at the Inquiry regarding 
inter alia their interactions with members of the African National Congress (ANC), 
and an inter-ministerial committee (IMC) sanctioned by cabinet to investigate the 
closure of the Gupta accounts. 
The South African Reserve Bank has stated that, if the banks had kept the Gupta 
accounts open, South Africa may have been locked out of the international finance 
network, resulting in large scale job losses.5 Dr Daniel Kaufmann (Kaufmann), an 
international economist, social scientist and academic who jointly coined the term " 
State Capture", testified at the Inquiry as an expert witness on State Capture and 
stated that State Capture can lead to erosion of the economy, plunge the economy 
into recession, destroy competition and increase unemployment.6 
 
                                                   
5 Tehillah Niselow "Reserve Bank Warned of 'Catastrophic' Impact if Banks Kept Gupta Accounts 
Open" 24-09-2018 https://mg.co.za/article/2018-09-24-reserve-bank-warned-of-catastrophic-
impact-if-banks-kept-gupta-accounts-open (8-09-2019). 
6 State Capture Inquiry, Nedbank transcript of 19 September 2018 50; and Hellman J and Kaufmann 
D. "State Capture in Transition: Submission to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of 
State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State"   
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/state-capture-in-transition.pdf (29-08-
2018). 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 STATE CAPTURE IN GENERAL 
2.1 What is State Capture? 
Oddly enough, the literature on State Capture is quite extensive which is surprising 
one would have thought that State Capture is a vicious concept only unique to South 
Africa. However, the phenomenon of State Capture appears to have been 
introduced as early as 1999 by a well-known academic on this topic, Joel Hellman, 
who used the term to refer to the corruption that had taken place in the East 
European countries.7 
State Capture is a pervasive and pernicious form of corruption. The notion of State 
Capture is however derived from the concept of "regulatory capture" which refers to 
"a problematic relationship between the regulator and 'special interests'".8 
Regulatory agencies are "captured" when they are regulated in accordance with the 
private interests of the a select few as opposed to the interests of the public for 
which they were mandated to protect and uphold.9 In considering regulatory capture, 
Hellman and Kaufmann note that "regulatory capture was limited to the formation of 
regulatory rules that directly affected industry".10 In broadening the definition of State 
Capture to extend beyond specific regulations, Hellman and Kaufmann extend the 
definition to include an array of laws, policies and rules that shape the state by 
defining State Capture as "the capacity to influence the formation of the basic rules 
of the game (i.e. laws, rules, decrees and regulation) through private payments to 
public officials".11 
With many definitions to consider, the most accurate definition was formulated by 
academics Catrina Godinho and Lauren Hermanus in their conference paper 
prepared for the Public Affairs Research Institute titled "(Re)conceptualising State 
                                                   
7 Dassah "Theoretical analysis of State Capture and its manifestation as a governance problem in 
South Africa" 2018 The Journal of Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 2–3. 
8 Dassah (n 7). 
9 Dassah (n 7). 
10 Hellman and Kaufmann (n 6) 3. 
11 Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann "Seize the State, Seize the Day: An empirical analysis of State 
Capture and corruption in Transition" (2000) Prepared for the ABCDE 2000 Conference 4. 
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Capture – with a case study of South African power company, Eskom".12 Godinho 
and Hermanus define State Capture as: 
 
"a political-economic project whereby public and private actors collude in 
establishing clandestine networks that cluster around state institutions in order to 
accumulate unchecked power, subverting the constitutional state and social contract 
by operating outside of the realm of public accountability. Where the political-
economic project of State Capture is successful, state institutions, governance and 
functions are re-purposed and re-engineered over time as the constitutional state is 
shifted away from the democratic to a more autocratic de facto and de jure system 
of power".13        
 
This definition gives rise to the following features that must be considered in 
assessing State Capture: 
 
(1) a political-economic project – Godinho and Hermanus suggest that political 
actors and others are motivated not only by economic interest but also the 
desire to stay in power and alter the laws of the state to their benefit without 
having to contend with the laws of a constitutional democracy.14 Some actors 
involved in State Capture believe or are made to believe that such a project 
is in the best interest of the country. Within the context of Eskom, Godinho 
and Hermanus note that the project in this case would be to bring about 
radical economic transformation capable of dismantling "white monopoly 
capital" and that the loss of political freedom would be worth such a project.15 
 
(2) public and private actors collude to establish clandestine networks – the 
public and private actors aim at developing a powerful network which 
                                                   
12 Godinho and Hermanus "(Re) conceptualising State Capture – with a case study of South 
African power company, Eskom" 2018 
https://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/files/Godinho_Hermanus_2018_ReconceptualisingStateCapture_Eskom.
pdf (27-09-2019) 3. 
13 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12). 
14 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 25–26. 
15 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 26. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the actions of the 
former minister of public enterprises, Malusi Gigaba, in replacing board members at Eskom and 
implementing new requirements for tenders (BEE ownership 50% +1) was publicly motivated by 
radical economic transformation. 
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relationships are characterised by collusion.16 The collusion allows the 
network, which is one of the most important features for identifying State 
Capture, to steadily gain power and resources in a flexible, opportunistic but 
strategic manner.17 
 
(3) clandestine networks cluster around state institutions to accumulate 
unchecked power – Godinho and Hermanus describes this as a distinctive 
feature of State Capture which exhibits a strategic progression and the 
success of State Capture hinges on: 
 
"establishing political legitimacy and support (clustering within political 
parties and politically powerful groups), disarming state institutions which 
could discover or combat corruption (for example – the police, national 
prosecuting authority etc…), experimenting at sub-national levels (for 
example – provinces or municipalities) or institutions that bear less scrutiny 
and then scaling up to bid for the real seats of power and resource 
distribution (for example – National Treasury or the biggest SOEs, like 
Eskom)."18 
  
Godinho and Hermanus also argue that the aim of State Capture extends far 
beyond rent-seeking19 for personal gains and is aimed at achieving 
unchecked power that has the ability to change the laws and policies to 
reform the state to extract greater resources, sustain and expand the 
network, conduct unilateral deals, suppress political opposition and even 
amend the Constitution.20 
 
(4) unchecked power subverts the constitutional state and prevailing social 
contract – State Capture is designed to work outside of the parameters of the 
                                                   
16 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 26. 
17 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 27. 
18 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 27. 
19 Rent-seeking is an economic concept that occurs when an entity seeks to gain added wealth 
without any reciprocal contribution of productivity. Typically, it revolves around government-funded 
social services and social service programs. Christina Majaski "Rent seeking" 28-08-2019 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rentseeking.asp (9-09-2019). 
20 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 28. 
 
 
13 
 
constitutional state and is by nature, unaccountable to the people or the 
project it is disguised as.  
 
With the above features in mind, State Capture is a powerful network composed of 
corrupt public and private actors which focus on parts of the state to influence their 
management and governance process to benefit their own private goals to the 
detriment of the public.21 As stated by Godinho and Hermanus: 
 
"State Capture involves the progressive re-purposing of governance through the 
quiet invasion of governance structures in such a way that agents of the State 
Capture are positioned to disperse government benefits to select groups, though the 
deals are ultimately negotiated and managed by brokers who allow State Capture 
agents to 'keep their hands clean'".22 
 
The captured state rewards connections over competence and influence over 
innovation.23 State capture is not merely a symptom of poor governance but a 
fundamental cause of poor governance.24 Hellman and Kaufmann state that once a 
state is captured, it is trapped in a vicious circle in which policy and institutional 
reforms necessary to improve governance is undermined by collusion private actors 
and public actors who benefit from the continuation of poor governance.25 
 
2.2 The characteristics of State Capture and how it is different to corruption  
As stated above, State Capture is a pervasive and pernicious form or subset of 
corruption. Corruption has been defined as the "misuse of public office for private 
gain" and flowing from that definition, State Capture has been regarded as "the 
primary subsets of how public office can be misused".26 Invariably, State Capture 
cannot exist without corruption as corruption, for example by means of bribery, 
                                                   
21 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 7. 
22 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 9. 
23 Hellman and Kaufmann "Confronting the Challenge of State Capture in Transition Economies" 
2001 Finance and Development: A quarterly magazine of the International Monetary Fund 5. 
24 Hellman and Kaufmann (n 23) 2. 
25 Hellman and Kaufmann (n 23) 2. 
26 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 5. 
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assists the captors in gaining influence, access to information and power of public 
office.27  
The process of State Capture however can be regarded as corrupt given the use of 
corrupt methods.28 State Capture can also be considered corrupt due to the 
damaging consequences it has on the economy and public interest. Godinho and 
Hermanus therefore argue that: 
"…State Capture is essentially corrupt because it seeks to cheat the social 
contract…State capture may have the appearance of state re-formation but the 
State Capture network seeks above all else to be beyond the reach of the law, 
accountable only unto itself, free to loot or oppress or extend patronage and 
favour".29 
However, the stark difference between corruption and State Capture is that the 
former is characterised by individual opportunistic actions for private gain whereas 
the latter is a more strategic progression of establishing a network with a goal of re-
shaping and re-purposing state institutions for the benefit of the captors.30 Another 
key distinction is that corruption aims at threatening the implementation of laws 
through bribery whereas State Capture involves corrupt attempts to re-shape laws. 
In addition, in captured states, the captors prejudice the rules to their own benefit 
which limits the benefits for others.31 With corruption, actors obtain individualised 
exceptions or favourable applications of the rules. The difference therefor lies in how 
deep the corrupt transaction penetrates the operations and functions of the state. It 
may however be difficult in some situations to draw the distinction between the two. 
In characterising State Capture, Hellman and Kaufmann analysed the data obtained 
from the designated "Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey" 
carried out jointly by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and observed the following: 
(1) countries that have a high propensity for State Capture or to be captured, are 
countries where there has been partial reform politically and economically. 
                                                   
27 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 5. 
28 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 11.  
29 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 11. 
30 Godinho and Hermanus (n 12) 11. 
31 Dassah (n 7) 12. 
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Although such countries have made progress in liberalisation, they are 
characterised by greater concentration of power and limitations on political 
competition; 
(2) State Capture is lower in countries that have pursued more comprehensive 
economic reform and increased civil liberties;32 
(3) few transition countries are completely transparent and have sufficient 
safeguards to ensure proper disclosure "creating an environment highly 
susceptible to capture";33 
(4) lack of competition allows political influence to be monopolised resulting in 
minimal checks and balances. Competition on the economy and political arena 
assist in preventing and combating State Capture;34 and  
(5) countries with a high degree of State Capture tend to make limited or even 
progress in transition from a more authoritarian economy to a more competitive 
market economy.35 
In concluding what State Capture is in general and what its inherent characteristics 
are, Dassah states that the essence of State Capture is:  
(1) a dubious relationship between a business or group of individuals and the 
state rooted in corrupt influence; 
(2) strategic actions by the captors to gain influence by bribery etc; 
(3) focussed on the process by which laws are made as opposed to the 
implementation of laws; 
(4) occurs usually in transitioning or post-conflict countries; 
(5) captors are usually private individuals; 
(6) main targets are formal state institutions and politicians who play key roles in 
the formation of laws; and 
                                                   
32 Hellman and Kaufmann (n 23) 3. 
33 Hellman and Kaufmann (n 23) 6. 
34 Hellman and Kaufmann (n 23) 7. 
35 Hellman and Kaufmann (n 23) 6.  
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(7) main aim is to undermine public interest by re-shaping the laws for undue 
advantage or private gain.36 
  
                                                   
36 Dassah (n 7) 9–10. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INQUIRY IN RELATION TO THE 
CLOSURE OF THE GUPTA ACCOUNTS 
3.1 Introduction 
Having established what exactly State Capture is, the inherent characteristics of 
State Capture and the differentiation between State Capture and corruption, the next 
step is to consider the events leading up to the Inquiry in relation to the closure of 
the Gupta accounts by the banks. This will assist in analysing whether the actions 
of the captors (i.e. the Guptas, certain ministers and members of the ANC) amount 
to a capture of the banking industry. 
It is important at this point to identify who the respective captors and captives are 
within the context of the banking industry. It is quite easy to conclude that the state, 
under the leadership of Zuma, had been captured due to many inferences that can 
be drawn from inter alia: (i) Jonas being offered the position of minister of finance 
by Ajay Gupta at the Gupta's residence in Saxonwold where inter alia Zuma's son, 
Duduzane Zuma, was present; (ii) Ms Mabel "Vytjie" Mentor (Mentor), a member of 
parliament, being offered the position of minister of public enterprises by Ajay Gupta; 
and (iii) the appointment of many associates of the Guptas to the boards of SOE's 
such as Transnet SOC Limited, Denel SOC Limited and Eskom. 
However, in assessing whether the banking industry has been captured, the 
captives (i.e. Zuma, his associates, certain ministers and members of the ANC), in 
being successfully captured and geared towards a political-economic project 
orchestrated by the Guptas, have now joined forces with the captors. Accordingly, 
within the context of the closure of Gupta accounts, the potential captors are now 
the Guptas, its associates as well as the "captured state", whereas the potential 
captive now is the banking industry. 
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3.2 Timeline of events  
Date Event 
October – 
November 2015 
Media reports started circulating about: (i) the close relationship 
between Zuma, his associates, certain ministers and factions within the 
ANC and the Guptas; and (ii) the Guptas offering Jonas and Mentor 
positions of minister of finance and minister of public enterprises 
respectively. 
1 December 2015 ABSA gave notice to the Guptas of its intention to close its bank 
accounts. 
February 2016 ABSA closed the bank accounts. 
16 March 2016 Jonas released a statement essentially confirming that he was offered 
the position of minister of finance by the Guptas. 
8 April 2016 Oakbay published a letter to its employees advising that they had 
requested Zuma and certain ministers to intervene in the closure of 
accounts. 
6 April 2016 Standard Bank gave notice to the Guptas of its intention to close its 
bank accounts from 6 June 2016. 
8 April 2016 Representatives of Oakbay addressed letters to Zuma, minister of 
mineral resources, Mosebenzi Zwane (Zwane), minister of finance 
Parvin Gordhan (Gordhan), minister of labour, Mildred Oliphant 
(Oliphant) and secretary general of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe 
(Mantashe), to intervene in the closure of the accounts. 
13 April 2016 The IMC was established by cabinet. 
19 April 2016 FNB's CEO received a call from Enoch Gondongwana (Gondongwana), 
a member of the ANC, advising that he was in the process of setting up 
meetings with the banks regarding the closure of client accounts. 
20 April 2016 ABSA, at the request of the NEC, attended a meeting with the ANC's 
National Executive Committee (NEC), at Albert Luthuli House. The 
meeting was attended by Mantashe, Godongwana, and Jessie Duarte 
and Krish Naidoo.  
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FNB's CEO received a message from Gondongwana enquiring on his 
availability to meet. FNB's CEO thereafter called Gondongwana and 
was advised that the meeting could take place on 22 April 2016 at the 
Albert Luthuli House. 
 
Nedbank attended a meeting at the Albert Luthuli House upon the 
invitation of Mantashe and Godongwana. The alleged purpose of the 
meeting was to allow the ANC to better understand the process that 
banks follow in closing accounts and to voice their concerns regarding 
the ability of a bank to unilaterally terminate relationship with its clients. 
21 April 2016 FNB's CEO sent a message to Gondongwana regarding who would be 
attending the meeting and no response was received save for the 
meeting being cancelled. 
 
Standard Bank was invited to attend the meeting with the ANC's NEC 
at the Albert Luthuli House. Standard Bank was asked at the meeting 
to "respond to accusation that it was colluding with 'white monopoly 
capital' to oppress black-owned business in the form of the Gupta 
entities".37 
 
22 April 2016 ABSA received an invite to attend a meeting scheduled for 25 April 2016 
before the IMC in respect of "certain allegations made against certain 
financial institutions". ABSA declined the invitation due to lack of 
information. 
FNB received an invite from the secretary of the IMC to also attend a 
meeting with the IMC. FNB declined the invitation also due to lack of 
information. 
4 May 2016 ABSA received a further invitation from the secretary of the IMC to 
attend a meeting to be held on 5 May 2016 for the purpose of allegedly 
discussing public comments made by ABSA in the decision to close the 
bank accounts of the Guptas. ABSA again declined the invitation. 
                                                   
37 State Capture Inquiry, Ian Sinton's statement of 13 August 2018 10. 
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FNB also received a further invitation by the secretary of the IMC to 
attend a meeting with the IMC on 5 May 2016. The invitation was later 
declined as no assurance was given to FNB that all members of the 
IMC would be present including Gordhan. 
Nedbank also received an invitation by the secretary of the IMC to 
attend a meeting with the IMC on 5 May 2016 the purpose of which was 
to "gain clarity on the current media reports and public statements made 
by Nedbank with regards to the closing of bank accounts and/or 
termination of relationships".38 The meeting was rescheduled for 6 May 
2016 and took place at Zwane's offices in Pretoria. Nedbank raised 
concerns that Gordhan was not in attendance and Zwane assured 
Nedbank that the IMC was quorate. Several questions were posed by 
Zwane regarding Nedbank's termination of its bank-customer 
relationship with the Guptas. Zwane also suggested that Nedbank 
should consider saving jobs since "the relevant family member had 
resigned from these companies".39 In closing, Zwane stated that he was 
surprised that other banks refused to attend the meeting "considering 
that the banks receive their licenses from Government".40 
Standard Bank received an invitation to attend a meeting with the IMC 
on 5 May 2016. 
5 May 2016 Standard Bank attended a meeting with the IMC with only Zwane and 
Oliphant being present. Standard Bank was of the view that the meeting 
was to secure a reversal of the decision by Standard Bank to close the 
accounts. 
13 May 2016 A meeting was held between senior management of the Oakbay group 
to dissuade Standard Bank from closing the accounts. 
6 June 2016 Standard Bank closed the bank accounts. 
                                                   
38 State Capture Inquiry, Michael Brown's statement of 29 August 2018 4. 
39 State Capture Inquiry (n 38). 
40 State Capture Inquiry (n 38). 
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1 September 
2016 
Zwane released a statement that the IMC had made recommendations 
to inter alia convene a commission of inquiry and that "the actions taken 
by the banks and financial institutions were a result of innuendo and 
potentially reckless media statements and as a South African company, 
Oakbay had very little recourse to the law". 
2 September 
2016 
The presidency released a statement advising inter alia that the 
statement made by Zwane was issued in his personal capacity and not 
on behalf of the task team or cabinet. 
October 2016 Minister Gordhan instituted an application seeking a declaratory order 
in the public interest "that he is not by law empowered or obliged to 
intervene in the relationship between [the Gupta family] on the one hand 
and [the four major banks] on the other hand, regarding the closing of 
the bank accounts held by the former with the latter".41 
The application was dismissed essentially on the basis that the court 
should not have to give judgment on an undisputed legal question. 
 
  
                                                   
41 Minister of Finance v Oakbay Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others; Oakbay Investments (Pty) Ltd and 
Others v Director of the Financial Intelligence Centre 2018 (3) SA 515 (GP) (18 August 2017) 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE BANKS 
4.1 Introduction 
The evidence presented by the banks spanned over 3 days with Kaufmann 
concluding the evidence by testifying as an expert witness on State Capture. In 
considering the testimonies of the banks, naturally, one would be able to observe 
the similarities in their testimonies as they testify on the legal framework within which 
banks operate as well as the internal processes that they adopt when deciding 
whether to terminate the bank-customer relationship or not.  
However, although the legal framework and internal processes are generally the 
same, there are some differences which are worth examining. Further, there are 
specific issues that arose during the evidence presented by the banks and which 
Zondo, almost in a cross-examination manner, questioned some of the banks on. 
Such specific issues include inter alia the audi alteram partem rule and the unilateral 
nature of the decision by banks to terminate the bank-customer relationship and 
close the relevant accounts of such customer. These issues may be of some 
importance to the banking industry in general and going forward. Accordingly, a brief 
summary of the testimonies of the banks will be provided when discussing some of 
the differences inherent in the legal framework and processes adopted by the banks 
before investigating the specific issues that have arisen. 
4.2 The legal framework and process considered and adopted by the banks in 
terminating the bank-customer relationship with the Guptas 
4.2.1 The legal framework applicable 
Through the testimonies of the banks, it is quite evident that the banks are subject 
to more or less the same international and domestic laws and standards, as they 
should be. These pieces of legislation include: 
(1) The Banks Act 94 of 199042 (Banks Act) which inter alia provides for the 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions; 
                                                   
42 The Banks Act 94 of 1990. 
 
 
23 
 
(2) Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA)43 which inter alia 
establishes the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) responsible for 
acceptance of financial data, analysis and dissemination of financial 
intelligence to the competent authorities and places an obligation on all inter 
alia financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to the FIC;44 
(3) Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (POCA)45 which inter alia 
provides measures to combat organised crime, money laundering and 
criminal gang activities; to provide for the prohibition of money laundering; 
and an obligation to report certain information;  
(4) Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related 
Activities Act 33 of 200446 which inter alia also provides measures to prevent 
and combat terrorist and related activities but also to give effect to 
international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities; and to 
provide for a mechanism to comply with United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions; and 
(5) Exchange Control Regulations which allows inter alia financial institutions to 
transfer foreign currency in and out of South Africa. 
The aforementioned pieces of legislation were all acknowledged by the banks as 
forming the basis upon which they were obliged to not only report suspicious and 
unusual activity relating to the Guptas' bank accounts to the FIC but also terminate 
its bank-customer relationship with the Guptas. In addition to the aforementioned 
pieces of legislation, ABSA, as a subsidiary of Barclays PLC at the time of closure 
of the bank accounts, testified that it was also obliged to adhere to the Basel III 
International Regulations (Basel III Regulations)47. The Basel III Regulations is a set 
of international banking regulations designed to promote stability in the international 
financial system and reduce damage to the economy by banks that take on 
                                                   
43 Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. 
44 Financial Intelligence Centre "Who We Are" 
https://www.fic.gov.za/aboutus/Pages/WhoWeAre.aspx (13-10-2019). 
45 Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. 
46 Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004. 
47 Bank for International Settlements "High-level Summary of Basel III Reforms" December 2017 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (13-10-2019). 
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excessive risk.48 It must however be noted that the Basel III Regulations is not novel 
in South Africa. The department of finance began implementing the Basil II 
Regulations as early as 1 January 2008.49 On 1 January 2013, South Africa 
implemented the Basel III framework which inter alia raising standards for 
supervision, risk management and public disclosures.50 
The banks also acknowledged that they had to adhere to international laws and 
regulations as banks often facilitate trade and investment across borders and 
participate in the international finance market. Accordingly, these banks are 
monitored by international banks especially in instances where the banks act as 
correspondent banks in order to facilitate trade and investment. It is worth noting 
that Standard Bank has experienced the immense consequences of not adhering to 
international laws and regulations where it conducted business in Tanzania. 
Standard Bank concluded a settlement agreement for 38 million US dollars with the 
serious fraud office in the United Kingdom and the United States' department of 
justice after cases of corruption was opened against Standard Bank by both 
authorities for employing a local partner in Tanzania that was partly owned by a 
Politically Exposed Person (PEP)51 in order to assist Standard Bank with negotiating 
a mandate with the Tanzanian government.52 The mandate was awarded, the 
partner paid its fee in US dollars and its corporate partner withdrew that fee in 
cash.53 According to a judge in the United Kingdom, the prosecution of Standard 
Bank was justified as Standard Bank should have foreseen that the local partner, 
being part of a PEP, would have shared the fee with the government of Tanzania 
and therefore should not have employed the local partner at all.  
Given the aforementioned, Standard Bank appears to interpret the applicable 
legislation in accordance with the principle that a banker will be guilty of an offence 
                                                   
48 Brian Perry "Understanding the Basel III International Regulations" 27 June 2019 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/10/understanding-basel-3-regulations.asp (13-10-
2019). 
49 South African Reserve Bank "South Africa's implementation of Basel II and Basel III" 
https://www.resbank.co.za/PrudentialAuthority/Deposit-takers/Banks/Supervision/Pages/South-
Africa's-implementation-of-Basel-II-and-Basel-III.aspx (13-10-2019). 
50 Brian Perry (n 48). 
51 In terms of the FIC guidelines, a PEP is defined as "an individual who is or has in the past been 
entrusted with prominent public functions in a particular country".    
52 State Capture Inquiry, Standard Bank transcript of 17 September 2019 37. 
53 State Capture Inquiry (n 52) 38. 
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if such banker should have been suspicious but transacted anyway. In this regard, 
Standard Bank has stated that: 
"we have regrettably experienced in dealing with international criminal justice systems 
in the United Kingdom and the USA, there they talk about disconsolable bill for 
blindness, people who are wilfully blind to wrongdoing can be as guilty as the 
wrongdoers themselves. That’s the view they have taken. We interpret our legislation 
to make the same provision."54  
But is this approach correct? Section 5 of POCA provides that: 
"a person that knows or ought reasonably to have known that property is or forms 
part of the proceeds of unlawful activities and enters into an agreement or engages 
in a transaction with some other in connection with that property, whether such 
agreement is legally enforceable or not alternatively preforms any act in connection 
with such property which has the outcome of concealing the nature, source, location, 
disposition or movement of the property in issue or its ownership thereof will be guilty 
of an offence".55 
Section 6 contains a similar money laundering offence - a person is deemed to have 
knowledge of a fact if he or she was actually aware of the fact or if a court finds that 
he or she knew there was a reasonable possibility that a fact existed yet failed to 
investigate.56 Van Jaarsveld57 uses the example of a bank employee, who suspects 
that money in a transaction may be from a crime yet continues with the transaction 
anyway without taken reasonable steps to investigate the matter, will be deemed to 
have knowledge of the source of the funds i.e. through a crime committed.58 Van 
Jaarsveld also states that a bank employee, who transfers funds to some other 
person commits a money laundering offence, if a reasonable bank employee would 
have suspected that the objective of the transaction was to launder the money.59 
FICA identifies the duty to report suspicious and unusual transactions as one of the 
important aspects of combatting money laundering.60 Banks essentially have 2 
                                                   
54 State Capture Inquiry (n 52) 13.  
55 s 5 of POCA. 
56 s 6 of POCA. 
57 Van Jaarsveld Money Laundering Control and Banks Part 2 (2012) 279. 
58 Van Jaarsveld (n 57). 
59 Van Jaarsveld (n 57) 280. 
60 Van Jaarsveld (n 57) 291. 
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reporting obligations to the FIC: (i) cash transactions over a prescribed limit;61 and 
(ii) any suspicious and unusual transactions.62 Further, in terms of section 29(2) of 
FICA, a bank employee that knows or suspects that a transaction may be suspicious 
or unusual must report the attempted transaction to the FIC notwithstanding the fact 
that the transaction was not concluded.63 Section 1(2) of FICA provides for when a 
person is said to have knowledge. Section 52(2) of FICA goes on to criminalise any 
failure to report a suspicious and unusual transaction by providing that a bank 
employee who reasonably ought to have known or suspected facts which would 
necessitate a reporting in terms of section 29 of FICA and negligently fails to report 
same, commits a money laundering offence. 
It therefore appears that the approach adopted by Standard Bank, as testified at the 
Inquiry, is the correct approach to adopt when adhering to the legal framework 
identified above. Although the other banks have not mentioned this approach, it 
would not be irrational to conclude that the other banks have in fact adopted and 
implemented a similar approach given that such approach is rooted in South African 
legislation as well. 
One of the international rules or standards that banks also need to adhere to is the 
International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism & Proliferation recommended by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
The FATF is an independent body established in 1989 during the G-7 World 
Economic Summit to: 
"develop and promote policies to protect the global financial system against money 
laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The FATF Recommendations are recognised as the global anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing standard."64 
According to Hugo and Spruyt,65 the recommendations by the FATF contain a 
comprehensive and consistent framework of measures which countries should 
                                                   
61 s 28 (a) – (b) of FICA. 
62 s 29 (1) – (2) of FICA. 
63 s 29(2) of FICA. 
64 FATF "International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
& Proliferation" (2012) www.fatf-gafi.org/recommendations.htm (13-10-2019). 
65 Hugo & Spruyt "Money laundering, terrorist financing and financial sanctions: South Africa's 
response by means of the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017" 2018 TSAR 227 
233. 
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implement in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.66 The FATF 
have established an international standard for combatting money laundering and 
terrorist financing which countries should adopt in a manner that is appropriate to 
each country's legal, administrative, financial and operational framework.67  
Some of the FATF recommendations include: 
(1) identify the risks, and develop policies and domestic coordination; 
(2) apply preventive measures for the financial sector and other designated 
sectors; and 
(3)  facilitate international cooperation.68 
 
4.2.2 The process adopted by the banks in terminating the bank-customer 
relationship 
To a large extent, the banks employed similar processes in arriving at the decision 
to terminate its respective bank-customer relationship with the Guptas and close the 
relevant bank accounts. These processes included the following: 
(1) taking cognisance of the negative media reports relating to the Guptas such 
as Jonas being offered the position of minister of finance by Ajay Gupta at 
the Gupta's residence in Saxonwold. FNB referred to this step as external 
monitoring.69 Standard Bank noted that it continuously monitors high-risk 
clients such as the Guptas for any conduct which may give rise to a suspicion 
that the client is involved in unlawful activity.70 
(2) The aforementioned then triggers an "internal investigation" the purpose of 
which is to gather all relevant information about the client and its activity. This, 
FNB describes as "internal monitoring".71 
(3) The information is then escalated to an independent committee which is 
tasked with (i) considering the information at hand, the legal framework as 
                                                   
66 Hugo & Spruyt (n 65) 233. 
67 Hugo & Spruyt (n 65) 233. 
68 FATF (n 64) 13. 
69 State Capture Inquiry, FNB and ABSA transcript of 18 September 2019 10. 
70 State Capture Inquiry (n 52) 17. 
71 State Capture Inquiry (n 69) 10. 
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well as the reputational and business risks that the client may pose to the 
bank in the event that it decides to continue with the bank-customer 
relationship; and (ii) making a decision on whether to continue with the bank-
customer relationship or not. Apart from Nedbank, it appears that the banks 
all employ an independent committee to consider the information at hand and 
decide on whether to terminate the bank-customer relationship or not. 
Nedbank has however stated that: 
"…we constituted a sub-committee of our group EXCO. That sub-committee 
was appropriately represented including myself, our head of risk, our head 
of legal and compliance, our head of our retail and business banking unit in 
which these accounts were held, the heads of some of the other of our 
frontline businesses as well as a group legal counsel."72 
 Nedbank's position gives rise to a question whether a committee that is 
established and mandated to review the information available, consider the 
legal framework and the reputational and business risks in continuing with a 
bank-customer relationship such as that of the Guptas, should not, by its very 
nature, be independent? The answer to this seems simple – such committee 
should be independent. Regardless of how senior the members of the 
committee are, if such senior members are also employees of the bank, they 
can never be said to be impartial. Senior executive employees, who may also 
be held liable for a fine or imprisonment in terms of the Banks Act, POCA and 
FICA, may invariably be persuaded to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship due to the reputational, business and personal risk even in 
instances where the information against the customer may not be that 
compelling or egregious. Likewise, employees of the bank who were, for 
example, the relationship manager assigned to the customer would, more 
often than not, have formed a good collegial relationship with the customer 
and may be more inclined to give the customer "the benefit of the doubt". 
(4) Once the decision has been made, the customer is notified of the decision 
typically by being issued a notice of the bank's intention to terminate the 
bank-customer relationship with reasonable notice being given to allow the 
                                                   
72 State Capture Inquiry, Nedbank transcript of 19 September 2019 15. 
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customer to make alternative arrangements. Standard Bank seems to adopt 
the approach that if the information at hand is not compelling or is ambiguous, 
it will engage with the customer with the purpose of giving the customer an 
opportunity to persuade the bank that the adverse information is unjustified.73  
(5) Once the decision has been communicated to the customer and if the 
customer requests a meeting to discuss the decision and any matters 
ancillary thereto, the banks will meet with the customer to discuss the 
decision.  
The aforementioned steps constitute the process adopted by the banks in electing 
to terminate the bank-customer relationship with the Guptas and close the relevant 
bank accounts. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that this process is 
adopted for any other customer that may pose a high-risk to the banks. 
 
  
                                                   
73 State Capture Inquiry (n 52) 17. 
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4.3 Specific issues that arose during the evidence presented by the banks  
Apart from the legal framework and processes adopted by the banks, there are two 
legal issues that are considered in great detail during the evidence presented by the 
banks at the Inquiry and which is worth considering the legal implications thereof 
herein. Such issues which may be important for the banking industry going forward 
are: 
(1) Are banks justified in taking a unilateral decision to terminate a bank-
customer relationship and close the relevant bank accounts of such customer 
without providing the customer with a hearing prior to the decision being 
taken? Does the audi alteram partem rule apply in such instances? 
(2) Are the principles that must be considered in the "reputational risk test" 
applied consistently?  
4.3.1 The unilateral decision by the banks to close the bank accounts and the audi 
alteram partem rule 
The issue regarding the unilateral nature of the decision taken by banks to terminate 
the bank-customer relationship and close the relevant bank accounts of the 
customer come before the Inquiry during the evidence presented by both Standard 
Bank and Nedbank. Zondo took the opportunity to raise his concerns regarding the 
unilateral nature of such decision.  
Standard Bank testified that if the information gathered about the customer was "not 
compelling or perhaps ambiguous", it would then engage with the customer "to allow 
the customer an opportunity to persuade them that the adverse information is 
unjustified".74 If the information was however compelling, the appointed committee 
would then make the decision whether or not to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship without providing the customer with a prior hearing. This immediately 
raised a red-flag for Zondo as he questioned why Standard Bank would not provide 
the customer with a hearing prior to the decision being taken regardless of how 
compelling the information/evidence against the customer is as a decision to 
terminate the bank-customer relationship is considered by Zondo to be "quite a 
                                                   
74 State Capture Inquiry (n 52) 17. 
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serious decision for the client".75 One cannot help but agree with Zondo that a 
decision to terminate the bank-customer relationship and close the relevant 
accounts is in fact a serious decision as it not only affects a business's ability to 
trade but to also to pay its employees. This is dealt with further in chapter 5. 
Zondo grappled with Standard Bank's approach to not provide a hearing especially 
where such decisions have serious repercussions for the individual or for a business 
and noted that: 
"even if we think this client might not really be able to explain this thing but let's hear 
what he or she has to say and then make our final decision because this is a very 
serious decision that we might take against this client".76  
Zondo seemed to suggest that it is unfair for a bank, which plays an important role 
in the affairs of a company, to make a decision without affording the customer an 
opportunity to explain even if the bank considers there to be a compelling case 
against the customer. Zondo went on to question whether the audi alteram partem 
rule can be applied in these instance as he is of the view that, although banks are 
not government entities, they nevertheless exercise a great deal of power and their 
decisions have far-reaching consequences. Standard Bank responded to Zondo by 
advising that the answer possibly lies in the locus classicus case of Bredenkamp v. 
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited (Bredenkamp)77 and noted that the contract 
which governs the bank-customer relationship is like any other contract and just like 
the customer can unilaterally terminate the contract with the bank, so does the bank 
have a contractual right to unilaterally terminate the contract with its customer.78  
As soon as Nedbank stated that it was not "in the business of closing accounts 
unilaterally",79 Zondo took the opportunity to also question Nedbank on the 
unilaterally nature of the decision taken by banks to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship and close accounts. Zondo summarised his interpretation of the 
evidence presented by the banks as follows: 
                                                   
75 State Capture Inquiry (n 52) 18. 
76 State Capture Inquiry (n 52) 19. 
77 Bredenkamp v. Standard Bank of South Africa Limited 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA). 
78 State Capture Inquiry (n 52) 20. 
79 State Capture Inquiry (n 72) 13. 
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(1) The decision is unilateral as the banks do not consult with other banks to 
ensure that there is no collusion; 
(2) The decision is that of the banks and theirs alone; and 
(3) They will not discuss the decision with the customer in advance of making a 
decision but after such decision is made, should the customer wish to discuss 
the matter, the banks will entertain such discussion.80 
It is quite clear that Zondo was of the view that it is unfair to unilaterally terminate 
the bank-customer relationship and close the relevant bank accounts of the 
customer without providing the customer with a hearing prior to such decision being 
taken. Zondo was also of the view that there would be no prejudice experienced by 
banks to afford the customer with a hearing prior to such decision being taken.  
Zondo seemed to suggest that the audi alteram partem rule must be applied in such 
instances. But can the audi alteram partem rule be applied in such instances? 
The audi alteram partem maxim was encompassed, under the common law, as part 
of the rules of natural justice81 and has now been recognised by the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA)82 as a requirement for procedurally fair 
administrative action.83  The maxim means that: 
"…when a statute empowers a public official or body to give a decision prejudicially 
affecting an individual in his or her liberty or property rights or existing rights, the 
latter has a right to be heard before the decision is taken".84 
In terms of the common law, the time of the hearing should be prior to the decision 
being taken.85 This allows the aggrieved party an opportunity of persuading the 
official to change his or her mind. Section 3(2) of PAJA provides that adequate 
notice of the proposed administrative action and a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations must be provided to the aggrieved party whose rights or legitimate 
expectations will be materially or adversely affected by the action.86  
                                                   
80 State Capture Inquiry (n 70) 14. 
81 The Law of South Africa (LAWSA) Lexis Nexus 22. 
82 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
83 LAWSA (n 81). 
84 LAWSA (n 81). 
85 LAWSA (n 81). 
86 s 3(2) of PAJA. 
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The test as to whether or not the maxim can find application in instances where the 
bank elects to unilaterally terminate the bank-customer relationship appears to be a 
three-pronged test: (i) is a bank a public official or body; (ii) is a bank capable of 
taking administrative actions; and (iii) does the decision of terminating the bank-
customer relationship and closing accounts prejudicially affect liberty, property 
rights, existing rights of the customer.  
A bank is certainly not a public official or public body. It may be argued that because 
of the significance of the business operation of a bank in collecting deposits, 
assisting trading and investment etc, it may be fulfilling a public role as these aspects 
of a bank's business assists with the growth of the economy. However, legally, there 
is not a single piece of legislation which classifies a bank as a public official or body. 
In respect of the second leg of the enquiry, administrative action is defined in section 
1 of PAJA as a decision, including the failure to take a decision, by an organ of state 
or a natural or juristic person in the course of exercising a public power or performing 
a public function in terms of an empowering provision which decision must adversely 
affect someone’s rights and have a direct external legal effect.87 For the action by a 
bank to terminate the bank-customer relationship to be classified as an 
administrative decision it must comply with the distinctive elements built into the 
definition of administrative action. It goes without saying that a bank is a juristic entity 
but whether it can perform a public power or public function which is of an 
administrative nature88 in terms of an empowering provision is strongly doubted for 
the following reasons: 
(1) According to Burns89, the purpose of the phrase “of an administrative nature” 
is to ensure that private law matters such as the conclusion of a contract are 
excluded from the ambit of the definition and the decision should be of a 
public law nature involving a relationship of inequality or subordination 
between the government and the individual or entity. 90 
(2) In terms of section 1 of PAJA, an "empowering provision" means law, a rule 
of common law, customary law, or an agreement, instrument or other 
                                                   
87 s 1 of PAJA. 
88 s 2(1) of PAJA. 
89 Burns Administrative Law under the 1996 Constitution (2003). 
90 Burns (n 89) 22. 
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document in terms of which an administrative action was purportedly taken.91 
This is an extremely wide definition and in essence means that the exercise 
of administrative power must have an authoritative basis and that any public 
power must derive almost exclusively from some or other statutory measure 
or other empowering provision.92 The right to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship does not emanate from any piece of legislation but is simply 
provided for in the Code of Banking Practice published by the Banking 
Association of South Africa.93  Further, it must be borne in mind that the 
relationship between the bank and a customer is based on the contract of 
mandate. 
 (3) The administrative decision must be taken by an organ of state or by a private 
person exercising a public power or performing a public function. In the case 
of Minister of Education, Western Cape v Governing Body, Mikro Primary 
School,94 the SCA held that any institution which exercises a public power or 
performs a public function in terms of legislation is an organ of state. The 
question therefore lies in whether a bank, in terminating the bank-customer 
relationship is performing a public function in terms of legislation. As stated 
above, the right to terminate the bank-customer relationship lies in the 
principles of contract law as the relationship between the bank and customer 
is based on the contract of mandate and therefore the general principles of 
contract law should therefore apply.  
Although one can conclude that the decision by the bank to terminate the bank-
customer relationship is not an administrative decision, the last leg of the inquiry is 
whether the decision will have a prejudicial effect on the customer's rights which is 
essentially an inquiry on whether on the decision will have a direct, external legal 
effect as set out in section 1 of PAJA. Although access to financial products and 
services is a key aspect of financial inclusion, there is no legislative right which 
provides that every individual or institution must have access to a bank account. The 
SCA held in the case of Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public 
                                                   
91 s 1 of PAJA. 
92 Burns (n 89) 22. 
93 The Banking Association of South Africa The Code of Banking Practice 2012. 
94 Minister of Education, Western Cape v Governing Body, Mikro Primary School 2006 (1) SA 1 
(SCA). 
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Works,95 that the action must have the capacity to adversely affect rights.96 The 
court in Van Zyl v New National Party and Others97 held that the phrase "direct, 
external legal effect" means that decision must be final that constitutes a legally 
binding determination of a legal entity's rights. It is submitted that it is not even 
necessary to consider whether the decision to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship will have a direct, external legal effect as it has already been established 
that there is no legislative right which provides that every individual or institution 
must have access to a bank account. 
The above analysis is by no means a complete analysis of the legal principles of 
administrative law derived from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
(Constitution) and PAJA, but it illustrates that the principles of the audi alteram 
partem maxi can find no application in the bank-customer relationship and therefore 
a customer is not entitled to a hearing prior to the decision being taken by a bank 
both in terms of the common law maxim or PAJA. The ability of a bank to terminate 
the bank-customer relationship which is based on the contract of mandate, is a 
contractual right which both parties agreed to when concluding the contract and thus 
banks are entitled to enforce such right when it becomes necessary to do so in 
accordance with the banks domestic and international obligations as set out in the 
legal framework above. 
It is also important to consider the principles that can be extrapolated from case of 
Bredenkamp. As stated above, Standard Bank raised the principles of the 
Bredenkamp case in answering Zondo's questions regarding inter alia the unilateral 
nature of the decision taken by banks in terminating the bank-customer relationship 
and closing the relevant accounts. Essentially the SCA held that Standard Bank, in 
the Bredenkamp case, had a valid contract with Bredenkamp that gave it the right 
to cancel the contract. Standard Bank exercised its contractual right to terminate the 
bank-customer relationship between it and Bredenkamp in a bona fide manner, 
providing reasonable time to Bredenkamp and such termination do not offend any 
constitutional right and was not contrary to public policy.98  
                                                   
95 Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 6 SA 313 (SCA). 
96 Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works (n 95) 33. 
97 Van Zyl v New National Party and Others 3 All SA 737 (C). 
98 Bredenkamp (n 77) 2; and Sharrock The Law of Banking and Payment in South Africa 2016 163. 
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In the case of Annex Distribution (Pty) Ltd & Others v. Bank of Baroda,99 in deciding 
whether the Bank of Baroda was entitled to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship between it and various entities operated by the Guptas, Makgoka J 
considered the principles as established in the Bredenkamp case and noted that: 
"the bank is entitled to terminate the relationship on reasonable notice, 
without any obligation to give reasons.  It motives for terminating the 
relationship are generally irrelevant, and that there is no self-standing right 
to reasonableness, fairness or goodwill in the law of contract.  Further, 
commercial entities had no right to insist that banking relationship continue 
against the bank's will.  A bank is entitled to terminate the relationship with 
a client on the basis of reputational and business risks and court should be 
reluctant to second-guess that decision. A bank is fully entitled to terminate 
the relationship with a client that has had bad reputation, irrespective 
whether the publicity about the client is true. The fact that a client may have 
difficulty finding another bank does not impose any obligation on a bank to 
retain the client."100 
 
  
                                                   
99 Annex Distribution (Pty) Ltd & Others v. Bank of Baroda [2017] ZAGPPHC 639. 
100 Annex Distribution (Pty) Ltd & Others v. Bank of Baroda (n 99) 27. 
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4.3.2 Application of the reputational risk approach applied by banks when 
considering whether to terminate the bank-customer relationship or not 
Another important issue that Zondo considered during the evidence presented by 
the banks was whether the reputational risk approach / test was applied 
consistently. Nedbank testified that in making their decision whether to terminate 
the bank-customer relationship or not will also depend on a consideration of the 
reputational and business risks that the bank might face.  According to FNB, a bank 
might face reputational risk if: (i) does not comply with the regulatory framework of 
the country in which it operates; (ii) conducts activities which are regarded as 
immoral or unethical; and (iii) if the bank's client base is involved in activities which 
introduce reputational risk to the bank.  FNB goes on to further state that:  
"a financial institution will not survive if its reputation and trust is not 
absolutely intact and that's why it is so critical that a bank, even the 
legislation prescribes bank to make sure that they manag101e reputational 
risk because the negative consequences of negative reputational risk on 
the institution has direct consequences on the business and the ability of 
the business to survive in future."102 
During the questioning by Zondo, it became evident that the activity of the customer 
does not need to be limited to criminal activities or necessarily have to be illegal but 
must be perceived as being illegal and the moment that there is a perceived negative 
reputational risk, the bank must make a decision on how to manage it. In trying to 
apply these principles to a factual scenario, Zondo questioned whether FNB would 
refuse to open a bank account of a political party that has certain political views. 
FNB went to great lengths to not answer the question directly stating that by simply 
being a political party does not automatically disqualify such a party from access to 
bank accounts but that internal deliberation must take place on whether the bank 
will take that political party on as a customer of the bank.  
Zondo then made a further example that if an individual or organisation might be 
perceived to be racist, would a bank then refuse to open the bank accounts or close 
such bank accounts as this may pose a reputational risk to the bank. FNB again 
                                                   
101 State Capture Inquiry (n 69) 17. 
102 State Capture Inquiry (n 69) 17.  
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avoided answering the question directly but eventually agreed with Zondo's 
submission that: 
"it is a very easy answer to give to say that any organisation or individual that 
espouses racism, the bank would not want to have any association with that person 
because a lot of people would not want to interact or associate with us if we are 
seemed to be associating with racists and so on".103 
Nedbank on the other hand explained that the business of a bank relies heavily on 
the trust of members of the public in the safety, soundness and systems of the bank 
to enable the bank to become custodians of savings in the form of deposits.  
Nedbank then made examples of instances where the reputational risk has been 
material that it has had a terminal effect on the business ability to continue operating.  
Such examples are KPMG and Mckinsey and Company. Nedbank then agreed with 
Zondo that a bank would consider terminating the bank-customer relationship not 
because the account holder has committed a crime or is in breach of any laws of a 
country, but simply because there is a certain perception in the public domain about 
the specific account holder.   
Zondo summarised the banks' position by stating that: 
"somebody who has not actually breached any of the laws of the country, you 
might close the accounts because there nevertheless is some reputational 
risks but in other cases, somebody who has not breached any laws but has 
some reputational risks to the bank, you might decide on balance not to close 
their accounts, it would just depend on the view you take of everything, is that 
right?"104 
In respect of the Gupta accounts, Nedbank noted that it was not the main 
transactional bankers of the Guptas and this would be a concern for Nedbank 
because if all other banks had closed their accounts, by default, Nedbank would 
have then become the main transactional banker and therefore inherit "an escalating 
level of reputational risk as a consequence of that".105  
                                                   
103 State Capture Inquiry (n 72) 68. 
104 State Capture Inquiry (n 72) 68. 
105 State Capture Inquiry (n 72) 68. 
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The consideration of risks in assessing the activities of the customers of a bank was 
first given its legislative recognition by the FICA Amendment Act 1 of 2017 
(Amendment Act) which introduced the risk-based approach. Hugo and Spruyt note 
that one of the most significant amendments introduced by the Amendment Act was 
the introduction of the risk-based approach as opposed to the former rule-based 
approach for identifying and assessing money laundering and terrorists financing 
risks.106 The risk-based approach is a more targeted approach which enables 
financial institutions to channel its resources and attention to areas of high risk.  
According to Hugo and Spruyt, the risk-based approach enables the application of 
resources commensurate to the risks being managed and mitigated.107  
The FATF has recognised that the risk-based approach is central to the effective 
implementation of the recommendations established by the FATF.108  According to 
the FATF, the risk-based approach means: 
"that countries, competent authorities and financial institutions, are expected to identify, 
assess and understand the money laundering and terrorist financing risks to which they are 
exposed and to take anti-money laundering, combating finance of terrorism measures 
commensurate to those risks in order to mitigate them effectively".109  
As set out by FNB and Nedbank as discussed above, the reputation of a bank is 
sacrosanct. The reputation of a bank has been defined as a bank's "…competence, 
integrity, and trustworthiness, which results from the perception of the group of 
stakeholders of a bank".110 Buckley and Nixon111 state that research has shown that 
banks are particularly sensitive to reputational risks and decisions made by banks 
reflect its reputational concerns.112 Reputation also influences the types of 
relationships that banks will maintain with their customers and the costs the bank is 
willing to incur to maintain those relationships.113 
The SCA in Bredenkamp held that it was not competent for a court to decide whether 
a valid business decision, informed by the reputational and business risk, taken by 
                                                   
106 Hugo and Spruyt (n 65) 236. 
107 Hugo and Spruyt (n 65) 237. 
108 FATF "Risk-Based Approach Banking Sector" 5. 
109 FATF (n 108) 8. 
110 FATF (n 108) 8. 
111 FATF (n 108) 9. 
112 FATF (n 108) 8. 
113 FATF (n 108) 10. 
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Standard Bank, was wrong in a case where no public policy considerations 
applied.114 Standard Bank's cancellation of the contract between it and Bredenkamp 
was not premised on the truth of the allegations against Bredenkamp but rather on 
the fact of the listing and the possible reputational and commercial consequences 
of the listing for the Bank.115 
It is trite that the application of the reputational risk approach / test is of critical 
importance for a bank when considering whether to continue with a bank-customer 
relationship or not. Whilst the view of Zondo that a bank would not want to have any 
association with any organisation or individual that, for example, espouses racism, 
as it may negatively affect its reputation seems plausible, banks should tread very 
carefully in becoming too involved in issues that are more subjective as opposed to 
money laundering, fraud and corruption which objectively ascertainable.  
Put differently, it is quite common for businesses to distance themselves from 
individuals who have received negative publicity such as for example, an athlete 
who loses their Nike sponsorships because the brand no longer wants to be 
associated with such an athlete any longer due to the negative publicity, however 
banks, who serve a much more important role in society and the economy, should 
avoid taking decisions to terminate the bank-customer relationship on issues that 
are, by its very nature, subjective. Considering the case of Vicki Momberg 
(Momberg), dubbed the "convicted racist", was found guilty of four counts of crimen 
injuria after racially attacking a police officer in 2016. What would the consequences 
be if one of the banks in South Africa had to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship with Momberg even prior to being convicted simply on the basis that an 
association with Momberg would negatively affect its reputation? Banks would be 
entering the political arena which it should never become embroiled in. Banks 
should remain objective and their decisions to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship based on inter alia reputational risk should always be centred around 
the principles advocated in FICA, POCA and other legislation which seeks to combat 
money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption and fraud – all of which are banks 
are empowered to objectively ascertain.   
                                                   
114 Bredenkamp (n 78) 21. 
115 Bredenkamp (n 78) 20. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5 ANALYSIS, LEGAL CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 General analysis 
The final issue, and the principal focus of this dissertation, is whether inter alia the 
actions by the ruling party and the establishment of the IMC can be regarded as an 
attempt by the state to interfere in the bank-customer relationship between the 
banks and the Guptas and whether such interference amounts to a reasonable and 
logical inference that the banking industry has indeed been captured. At the outset, 
some may already be inclined to conclude that the banking industry has been 
captured simply based on what has been reported in the media and the shocking 
truths that have been revealed at the Inquiry. Some may even argue that it would 
be very hard to believe that the banking industry has not also been captured when 
the state itself has been captured. However, with all the relevant facts placed in 
context, as set out in the timeline above in chapter three and considered objectively 
in light of the relevant legislative framework, a different conclusion may be reached.  
The timeline set out above is useful in illustrating when the banks elected to close 
the bank accounts of the Guptas, the establishment of the IMC and the various 
meeting requests addressed to the banks by both the ANC and the IMC in a very 
short timeframe. Oddly enough, the timeframe illustrates that the IMC was 
established by cabinet on 13 April 2016 prior to the ANC first becoming involved on 
19 April 2016 when FNB's CEO received a call from Godongwana who, at the time, 
was simply a member of the ANC's NEC and did not hold any public office.  
The ANC, represented by Godongwana, Mantashe and Duarte, requested all of the 
banks to meet with them seemingly under the guise of discussing the closure of 
bank accounts in general, the judgment of Bredenkamp, the effects of closure of 
bank accounts and possible collusion amongst the banks. Save for FNB, all of the 
banks attended the meeting with the ANC at the Albert Luthuli House. What is 
concerning from these meetings is that the ANC questions the banks on the 
following: 
(1) The unilateral nature of the decision by the banks to terminate the bank-
customer relationship noting their concerns with such unilateral decision; and 
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(2) The allegation that the banks had been colluding and particularly the 
statement made to Standard Bank that it was colluding with "white monopoly 
capital" to oppress black-owned businesses in the form of the Guptas entities. 
Although the purpose of the aforementioned meetings appeared to be, on the face 
of it, an opportunity by the ANC to understand the legal framework within which 
banks can unilaterally terminate the bank-customer relationship and close the 
relevant bank accounts of such customer, one cannot help but wonder whether 
these meetings were strategically planned to: (i) take place before the meetings to 
be held by the IMC especially given the fact that the IMC was established by cabinet 
prior to the meetings with the ANC; and (ii) to place subtle pressure on the banks 
before the meetings with the IMC. This sequence of events seems to indicate 
collusion and is highlighted further below. 
After the ANC's meetings with the banks, the very next day on 22 April 2016, both 
ABSA and FNB received the first invite to attend a meeting with the IMC.  Both ABSA 
and FNB declined the invitation due to lack of information received from the IMC. 
Only Nedbank and Standard Bank attended the meetings held at the minister of 
mineral resources offices in Pretoria. Noteworthy, the meeting was not at 
parliament, the Reserve Bank's offices or the minister of finance's office and only 
Zwane and Oliphant were present.  The minister of finance was not present at any 
of the meetings. The implications of this is discussed below. 
The following issues of concern were raised at the IMC meetings: 
(1) Whilst understanding that none of the banks would discuss any information 
relating to any specific client including the Guptas and the closure of such 
accounts, the IMC nevertheless stated that the closure of the Gupta accounts 
would effect approximately 60 000 South African who would then be deprived 
of a possible income of payment should Standard Bank not reconsider its 
decision to close such accounts; 
(2) The IMC further indicated that in instances where banks are faced with the 
well-being of employees and their dependants versus compliance with 
applicable laws, that banks should favour such employees and dependants 
above the risk for non-compliance with the law; 
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(3) The IMC further indicated that banks should not be allowed to close bank 
accounts with Zwane specifically stating that they could "change the law and 
that they would consider recommending changes to the law to make it illegal 
for banks to close accounts";116  
(4) At the end of the meeting, Zwane reminded Standard Bank that they operate 
under a license provided by the government and accordingly they should be 
more responsive to concerns raised by the government; 
(5) At the meeting with Nedbank, Zwane noted that Nedbank was not the main 
transactional bankers of the Guptas and made a suggestion to Nedbank to 
step in and become the main transactional bankers in order to save jobs 
especially given the fact that the relevant family members have resigned from 
their positions in the specific entities; and 
(6) Zwane noted that it was surprising that other banks have refused to attend 
the IMC meetings especially where government had issued the licenses to 
the banks. Nedbank noted that this was an inaccurate statement as licenses 
are not issued by the government but are issued by the Reserve Bank and 
therefore Nedbank saw this as a form of a threat. 
The meetings held by the ANC and the IMC are not the only actions of concern.  
The following actions are rather concerning as well: 
(1) On 8 April 2016, and prior to the establishment of the IMC, the 
representatives of Oakbay addressed letters to Zuma, Zwane, Gordhan and 
Oliphant as well as the secretary general of the ANC, Mantashe, to intervene 
in the closure of the bank accounts by the banks; 
(2) After the conclusion of the IMC meetings, on 1 September 2016, Zwane 
released a statement in which he recommended to cabinet that a 
commissioner of inquiry be convened into inter alia the actions taken by the 
banks; 
(3) Shortly thereafter, on 2 September 2016, the Presidency released a 
statement that Zwane's statement was made in his personal capacity and not 
                                                   
116 State Capture Inquiry (n 52) 43. 
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on behalf of the task-team or cabinet. The effect of such statement is that the 
Presidency acknowledged the establishment of the IMC by cabinet to 
investigate the closure of the Gupta accounts. 
These actions will be referred to as the "impugned actions". 
In respect of the consequences on the employees, one will automatically dismiss 
the argument put forward that the closure of the Gupta accounts would have dire 
consequences on the employees employed by Oakbay and its related companies 
simply due to the  extent of corruption and astonishing events leading up to the state 
being captured. However, does the argument not have some plausibility to it? It is 
submitted that it does. The Gupta group of companies is made up of 14 separate 
entities each of which employs a significant number of employees. Whilst one can 
accept that these group of companies, under the control of the Guptas, have been 
involved in an excessive amount of corruption, collusion, fraud and money 
laundering, we cannot necessarily conclude that each and every employee was 
either involved or complicit in such crimes. One can also accept that the effect of 
the closure of all the bank accounts of the Guptas by the banks will have dire 
consequences on employees as (i) salaries and wages cannot be paid; and (ii) the 
trading ability of these entities will be greatly affected leaving it essentially unbanked 
and will inevitably lead to retrenchment and job losses. Surely this should be of 
some consideration to banks when deciding whether or not to terminate the bank-
customer relationship with large conglomerates especially in South Africa given the 
high statistics of unemployment and poverty. In Bredenkamp, Lamont J stated that 
banks do not operate in isolation and must adhere to international and domestic 
legislation.117 Considerations of public policy should at least be a factor taken into 
account by banks when deciding whether or not to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship especially since such decision is essentially unilateral and not subject 
to judicial oversight. Although public policy consideration is a very shaky concept to 
apply in contract law, surely a balance can be struck between ensuring compliance 
with a bank's international and domestic laws and regulations and ensuring that 
innocent employees are not unnecessarily affected. This may be a difficult task for 
legal academics to solve. 
                                                   
117 Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2009 (6) SA 277 (GSJ) 32. 
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5. 2 Analysis on whether the impugned actions meet the essential factors of State 
Capture 
At first glance, it would appear that the banking industry has not been captured 
simply because the banks chose not to reconsider its decision to terminate the bank-
customer relationship. However, in light of that stated above in chapter 2 on what 
State Capture is, its inherent characteristics and its differentiation to corruption, the 
following essential factors must be considered in assessing whether the banking 
industry has, within a legal context, been captured: 
(1) the captors are motivated not only by economic interest but also the desire 
to stay in power and alter the laws of the state to their benefit;  
(2) the powerful network that is developed amongst captors are characterised by 
collusion; and 
(3) the powerful network seeks to influence the management and governance 
process of the targeted entity or state (and in this case, the banking industry) 
to benefit their own private goals to the detriment of the public. 
Before assessing each factor, it is important to understand the specific roles of each 
individual or entity in State Capture. As stated above, within the context of whether 
the banking industry has been captured, the captors in this instance are the captives 
who were previously captured and who are now fulfil the goals of its captors i.e. the 
Guptas were the captors who captured the state (the president, certain cabinet 
members and certain members of the ANC) and the captured state is now fulfilling 
the goals of the Guptas by attempting to capture the banking industry.  
Accordingly, in respect of the first factor, can it be said that the captured state, in 
fulfilling the goals of its captors i.e. seeking to have the banks reconsider its decision 
to close the Gupta accounts, has altered the laws or attempted to alter the laws to 
the benefit of the Guptas? Certainly the subtle threats made by Zwane that he could 
"change the law and that they would consider recommending changes to the law to 
make it illegal for banks to close accounts" and his public statement recommending 
for an inquiry into the closure of the Gupta accounts is certainly a strong indication 
of an attempt to obtain an alteration in the laws applicable but which attempt never 
materialised. An amendment to the laws applicable to banks would require an 
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amendment to the Banks Act and the legislation under which the South African 
Reserve Bank (Reserve Bank) operates. This is discussed further below. 
Secondly, it can be concluded that the powerful network consisting of the president, 
the Guptas, certain cabinet ministers and certain members of the ANC, is 
characterised with collusion and more importantly corruption. As stated above, 
corruption is the misuse of public office for private gain and it is quite reasonable to 
conclude there has been an extensive amount of corruption if the Guptas can baldly 
state that they have made six billion rand from the state and would have liked to 
increase it to eight billion rand with the help of Jonas and treasury when the Guptas 
offered Jonas the position of minister of finance. Likewise, there has been an 
extensive amount of collusion which can simply be inferred from the sequence of 
events – the Guptas addressed letters to inter alia the president, the ANC and 
certain cabinet ministers to intervene in the closure of their accounts; a mere five 
days later, cabinet establishes the IMC; and the ANC becomes involved six days 
later.  
Lastly, and without hesitation, it can be concluded that the captured state sought to 
influence the management and governance of the banks for the private gain of the 
Guptas to the detriment of the public. The captured state sought to influence the 
decisions of the banks to re-open the bank accounts of the Guptas to their benefit 
(and possibly a lucrative incentive for those involved) to the detriment of the public 
as this would have resulted in the banks contravening the international and domestic 
laws and regulations and led to an array of consequences such as plunging South 
Africa's economy into a recession and increasing unemployment. However, it 
remains merely an attempt by the captured state to influence the decisions of the 
banks as they were not successful in doing so.  
Accordingly, simply based on a legal analysis of what State Capture is and the 
essential factors which inform State Capture, one can conclude that the banking 
industry has not been captured as the essential factors have not been met. 
However, the actions of the captured state definitely constitute attempts, and good 
attempts at that, to capture the banking industry.  
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5.3 Analysis based on applicable legislation 
Regardless of the fact that a bank is a (i) authorised financial service provider; (ii) 
banking institution in terms of the Banks Act; and (iii) a registered credit provider in 
terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005,118 it is nevertheless still a public 
company duly registered and incorporated as such. One would therefore assume 
that, like any private business, the state cannot simply interfere with the operations 
of a bank. However, we cannot escape the fact that banks are, by its very nature, a 
far more complex business and are subject to more stringent laws and standards, 
both domestically and internationally. So how does one therefore establish whether 
the actions taken by the captured state, are not legally competent? 
There is no single piece of legislation enacted in South Africa which outright 
stipulates that the state cannot interfere with any aspect of private businesses 
especially private businesses such as a bank. Perhaps the starting point is to 
consider the mandate and powers of the Reserve Bank which is responsible for the 
registration of banks through the Prudential Authority (PA) established by the 
Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (FSR Act).119 The Prudential Authority is 
a separate juristic entity but which operates within the administration of the Reserve 
Bank.120 The Prudential Authority, through the administration of the Reserve Bank, 
must  regulate and supervise banks.121 
The Reserve Bank is a fairly independent institution which is subject to sections 223 
and 225 of the Constitution, the South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 
(Reserve Bank Act)122 and accompanying regulations. Its independence stems from 
section 224 of the Constitution which provides that: 
"the Bank, in pursuit of its primary object, must perform its functions independently 
and without fear, favour or prejudice but there must be regular consultations 
between the Bank and the Cabinet member responsible for national financial 
matters".123 
                                                   
118 National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
119 s 32 of FSR Act. 
120 s 32(2) of FSR Act. 
121 s 34(1)(i) of FSR Act. 
122 South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989. 
123 s 224 of the Constitution.  
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Section 10 of the Reserve Bank Act provides for an array of powers and duties of 
the Reserve Bank which includes establishing, monitoring, regulating and 
supervising all procedures and systems employed by banks in conducting the 
functions of a bank such payment, clearing or settlement systems.124 Accordingly, 
the Reserve Bank can be described as the "custodian of banks"  or the "primary 
regulator" responsible for inter alia regulating and monitoring the operations of 
banks. 
The Reserve Bank however does not enjoy complete independence as it is obliged 
to consult with the minister of finance regularly who is responsible for national 
finance matters as set out in section 224 of the Constitution. The duties of the 
minister of finance include management of government's financial affairs, 
formulating the national budget, and developing economic policies. Apart from 
Reserve Bank and the minister of finance, there are other regulatory bodies which, 
to some extent, also have jurisdiction over banks. These regulatory bodies include: 
(i) the FIC; (ii) the Financial Service Conduct Authority also established by the FSR 
Act; and (iii) the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
(FAIS)125 which regulates the provision of financial services. The Reserve Bank, the 
Prudential Authority and the minister of finance however remain the principal 
regulatory and supervisory bodies which has jurisdiction over the banking industry. 
In establishing who has jurisdiction over banks in South Africa, it becomes easy to 
assess whether the impugned actions taken by the captured state were legally 
competent or not. In none of the actions taken by the state and the ANC, were the 
Reserve Bank or the minister of finance, who in fact has jurisdiction over the banks, 
present at any of the meetings or involved in the discussions with the banks. Instead 
a political party and an Inter-Ministerial Committee established by cabinet headed 
by the minister of mineral resources, who has no involvement in the banking 
industry, engaged with banks about matters that fall solely within the banking 
industry and the laws applicable thereto. The only logical and reasonable inference 
that can be drawn from the above is that these individuals, acting in their public 
                                                   
124 s 10 of the Reserve Bank Act. 
125 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002. 
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capacities, were attempting to influence the decisions of the banks to reconsider its 
positions on the closure of the bank accounts of the Guptas.  
5.4  Legal consequences and conclusion 
The attempts to capture the banking industry was successfully defended as the 
banks remained steadfast in their decision to terminate the bank-customer 
relationship with the Guptas. At the helms of these banks are exceptionally 
competent, experienced and ethical leaders who are not only aware of the 
international and domestic laws and regulations which must be complied with but 
also understand the consequences of non-compliance. Had the leadership of these 
banks been any different, it may not have been able to successfully defend attempts 
by the state and the ANC to influence its decisions. 
Although it can be stated that the banking industry has not been captured, the 
actions by the state and the ANC can be regarded as attempts, and good attempts 
at that, to capture the state by attempting to influence the decisions of the banks. 
This does not however exclude the possibilities of corruption. The attempts to 
capture however presents 2 important lessons: 
(1) it illustrates that the banking industry is capable of being captured just like 
any other institution or parastatal such as Transnet SOC Limited, Eskom etc. 
In other words, the sacrosanctity of the banking industry can be 
compromised. Had it in fact been Gordhan that was involved in the meetings 
held with the banks, he may have been able to persuade the banks 
differently; and 
(2) had there not been competent, experienced and ethical leadership at these 
banks, it would not have been very difficult to capture the banks by 
influencing their decisions.  
Had Nedbank heeded to some of the threats made by Zwane, reversed its decision 
to terminate the bank-customer relationship with the Guptas and become the 
Guptas' main transactional banker, it would have resulted in the sacrosanctity of the  
banking industry being compromised. The consequences would have been dire: 
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(1)  Nedbank would have failed to comply with domestic laws such as FICA and 
POCA; 
(2) Nedbank would have failed to comply with international laws and standards for 
money laundering etc; 
(3) The continuation of the bank-customer relationship with the Guptas would 
have caused reputational damage to Nedbank due to (i) the negative and 
illegal actions of the Guptas; and (ii) the non-compliance with both the 
domestic and international laws; and 
(4) South Africa would have been locked out of the international trade market 
which would have greatly affected the economy and increased job losses and 
poverty. 
The termination of the bank-customer relationship by the banks and the closure of 
the Gupta accounts was arguably the beginning of the end for the Guptas as 
everything began to spiral out of control until the Guptas eventually fled South Africa. 
One can only assume that, if the Gupta accounts were not closed, the Gupta entities 
would, in all likelihood, still have been trading in South Africa. Although it has been 
established that the banking industry has not been captured, it has been established 
that it is not immune to capture, and its sacrosanctity can be compromised. This 
illustrates the importance of the banks and for it to remain independent to enable it 
to make objective decisions based on established law. 
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